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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a road map for building a contingent claims theory of limit order markets
grounded in a simple observation: limit orders are equivalent to a portfolio of cash-or-nothing and
asset-or-nothing digital options on market order flow. However, limit orders are not conventional
derivative securities: order flow is an endogenous, non-price state variable; the underlying asset
value is a construct, the value of the security in different order flow states; and arbitrage trading or
hedging of limit orders is not feasible. Fortunately, none of these problems is fatal since options on
order flow can be conceptualized as bets implicit in limit orders, arbitrage trading can be replaced
by limit order substitution, and plausible assumptions can be made about the endogeneity of order
flow states and their associated asset values. The analysis yields two main results: Arrow-Debreu
prices for order flow ‘‘states’’ are proportional to the slope of the limit order book and the limit order
book at one time proves to be identical to that at an earlier time adjusted for the net order flow since
that time when all information arrives via trades.
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A dozen or so years ago, I visited David Whitcomb in his New York apartment to view 
his limit order trading system.  He invited me to do so under the misapprehension that I might be 
able to help him find a buyer, a notion of which he was rapidly disabused.1  I came away 
remembering one detail of the system:  limit orders were always canceled if they were not 
executed within two minutes because the specialist’s commission – a number on the order of a 
mil at the time as I recall – was only paid on orders that resided on the book more than two 
minutes.  The idea that stuck with me is that one could learn a great deal about optimal trading 
strategies by paying close attention to the minutiae of the microstructure of a market.  Anyone 
who feels the need to verify the claim that I see value in paying attention to such minutiae should 
examine the description of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in Lehmann and Modest (1995). 
The research reported here marries this observation with a simple idea:  the apparatus of 
state pricing can be applied profitably in microstructure.  Just as Hicks (1939) noted that 
conventional microeconomic theory could be applied to economic dynamics by treating the same 
goods on different dates as different commodities and Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) showed 
that dynamics under uncertainty could be analyzed similarly by treating the same good on 
different dates in different states of nature as different commodities, it has long seemed to me 
that one could exploit this strategy in microstructure by defining states in terms of trade prices, 
quotes, and quantities.  Limit order markets are a natural environment within which to apply this 
idea precisely because the mechanical nature of the order execution process makes for a clear 
definition of order flow states. 
The idea of using contingent claims analysis in a microstructure setting is hardly new:  
since at least Copeland and Galai (1983), it has been commonplace to view quotes or limit orders   2
as free options given by limit order traders or market makers to market order traders who may 
possess superior information regarding asset values.  On this view, a limit buy (sell) order is a 
call (put) option with a strike price equal to the limit price with an implicit option premium — 
actually a contingent premium since it is not paid unless the option is exercised — given by the 
spread between the limit price and the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, albeit one with an 
uncertain expiration date since limit orders are typically good until cancelled.   This spread 
reflects the by now classic balance between losses to informed investors and profits from 
uninformed liquidity traders along with traders who falsely believe they possess value-relevant 
private information. 
Examining this implicit option from the perspective of limit order traders sheds quite 
different light on the sources of value in limit orders.  A limit buy (sell) order for Xt shares 
involves the receipt (expenditure) of PtXt dollars in exchange for (delivery of) Xt shares.  In the 
language of exotic options markets, the first payoff is that of Xt cash-or-nothing digital call 
options struck at Pt and the second is the same as that on Xt asset-or-nothing digital call options 
struck at Pt as well.  Since limit order markets only result in transactions at a given price Pt(q) 
when a market order of size Qt is large enough to hit the limit orders posted at the price (i.e., 
when Qt ≥ q), one can view these implicit derivative securities as options on order flow. 
The chapter is laid out as follows.  The next section describes both my assumptions about 
limit order markets and the digital options implicit in limit orders.  The third section is devoted 
primarily to the identification of the Arrow-Debreu prices for order flow ‘states’ based on the 
implicit options embedded in the limit order book.  Care is needed since these implicit digital 
options differ in important ways from their analogues in conventional derivative asset markets 
since the nature of the underlying asset, the definition of states of nature, and the notion of 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 As I recall, the asking price was $10 million and the proposed commission was 10 per cent.   3
arbitrage are not entirely straightforward in this context.  The penultimate section derives some 
perhaps surprising implications for limit order book dynamics and the final section provides 
brief concluding remarks. 
2.  Limit Orders as Order Flow Derivatives 
Consider a limit order book market for a single security with a marginal price schedule 
Pt(q) where q is positive for buy orders and negative for sell orders.  Limit orders are placed 
prior to time t and so Pt(q)∈Ft–1 where Ft–1 is public information available before time t 
including, at minimum, past quotes along with transactions prices, quantities, and times.   
Assume for now that Pt(q) is continuous; that is, there is no minimum price variation or 
minimum tick. 
Since incoming market orders are executed against standing limit orders, the overall cost 
of a market order for Qt shares is 
t
t 0 P( ) d ∫
Q
qq  where Qt and q are positive for buy orders and 
negative for sell orders – that is, the market order walks up or down the book until it is filled.  
Note that all orders at the same limit price are treated symmetrically in this limit order book — 
that is, price priority is strictly maintained while both size and time priority are ignored.  Neither 
omission should be of great importance in this market since one can always step ahead of an 
existing order by posting one at an infinitesimally better price.   
This market should be thought of as one that operates without frictions, save for enough 
slippage to permit limit order traders to cancel old orders and/or submit new ones before the next 
market order arrives.  There are no dealers like NYSE specialist who can see the book before 
taking a position or stepping in front of an existing limit order in the book. There are no hidden 
limit orders that market order traders might “ping” to discover how much immediacy resides in 
the undisclosed portion of the book.  There are no limits on how many tiers of the book a single   4
market order can clear out as there are on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  Some of these frictions 
can be handled by careful definition of the “state” of the book and some cannot.  I will not deal 
with them in what follows. 
  No special assumptions are made about order flows at this point.  There can be limit or 
market orders that follow arbitrary stochastic processes that depend in arbitrary ways on the 
slope, depth, and history of the limit order book as well as other public information.  To be sure, 
most of the heavy lifting in microstructure models involves the determination of the optimal 
order placements of informed investors and/or optimizing liquidity traders, all of which requires 
numerous assumptions about the economic setting.  The present exercise is much easier since it 
only involves the mechanics of order execution in a stylized limit order market.  Some modest 
assumptions about order flows and execution will be made in the next two sections.   
The analysis of contingent claims written on order flows begins with the three possible 
events that might transpire at time t:  the arrival of a market buy order (i.e., Qt > 0), of a market 
sell order (i.e., Qt < 0), or of information without an intervening trade including, perhaps, that the 
clock has ticked without the arrival of a trade (i.e., Qt = 0).  This last prospect will often lead to a 
revision of the limit order book, an instance of the good until cancelled feature of limit orders.    
In this context, my assumption that there is a tatônnement-like process permitting limit order 
traders to freely cancel and submit orders prior to the next market order arrival means that limit 
order traders, by assumption, have placed the limit orders they think appropriate given all of the 
information available to them at time t.   
Now suppose a market buy order arrives for Qt > q shares at time t and consider a limit 
order that offered one share at price Pt(q).  Since this limit order is executed for sure (i.e., Qt > 
q), the limit order trader exchanges one share of stock for Pt(q) dollars.  In the language of exotic 
options, a contingent claim that pays a fixed cash flow in a given eventuality is called a cash-or-  5
nothing digital call option and so the cash flow from a limit sell order is the payoff on a cash-or-
nothing digital call option struck at Pt(q).  Similarly, a contingent claim that pays a share in a 
given state is called an asset-or-nothing digital call option and so the share transfer in this 
transaction is the payoff of an asset-or-nothing digital call option struck at Pt(q) as well.  I will 
follow Ingersoll’s (2000) nomenclature and refer to cash-or-nothing digital calls and puts as 
digital options and to asset-or-nothing digital calls and puts as digital shares.  
Hence, limit orders implicitly bundle digital option and share positions.  A limit buy 
order is equivalent to a long position in a digital option and a short position in a digital share, 
each struck at Pt(q).  Each implicit digital option pays Pt(q) dollars if Qt  ≥  q and expires 
worthless if Qt < q.  Similarly, each implicit digital share converts into a share if Qt ≥ q and 
expires worthless otherwise.  By the same token, a limit sell order is equivalent to a short 
position in a digital option and a long position in a digital share.  The former requires the 
payment of Pt(q) dollars when Qt ≤ q and the latter involves the receipt of a share in these 
circumstances.  Both expire worthless if Qt > q.   
Since a limit order involves no up front cash flows, the value of these two implicit 
options must be the same.  Accordingly, any analysis that delivers the value of one option 
position implicitly determines that of the other position as well.  In addition, any such valuation 
must take account of the fact that these derivatives are implicitly written on order flow, a non-
price state variable. 
This is a weaker restriction than that derived in Ingersoll (2000) for conventional digital 
options or shares.  After all, the underlying asset price, a quantity measured in dollars, is always 
available to compute the relative value of digital options and shares in any state of nature.   
However, market order size is a non-price state variable and there is no observable that 
corresponds to the value of a share in different order flow states.  This inability to mechanically   6
assign a value to the digital share on expiration or to a claim to a dollar in the same state of 
nature is the main obstacle to the straightforward computation of the value of the contingent 
claims implicit in limit order books. 
A digital call (put) can be replicated by a bull (bear) spread in conventional call (put) 
options with an infinitesimal spread between the two strike prices.  This observation is of limited 
utility for limit order valuation purposes since it is hard to imagine a market in which it is easy to 
form a bull spread in conventional options at the appropriate strikes just before a market order 
arrives that expires on the arrival of the market order.  It may be of some use in reverse:   
inferences regarding the prices of order flow states implicit in the limit order book can provide 
insight into microstructural effects on the value of very short expected maturity options.   
However, this fact does yield one modest insight concerning the riskiness of the 
derivatives implicit in limit orders.  As is well-known, at-the-money digital options with short 
time to expiration are highly sensitive to changes in the underlying asset value because the 
absolute values of their deltas and gammas – that is, the sensitivity of the bull spread to changes 
in the underlying asset price and its square, respectively – can both be large in absolute value 
and fluctuate a great deal.  Moreover, the gamma of such a digital call can change signs and its 
delta is unbounded.  Accordingly, the prices of limit orders should be quite sensitive to changes 
in both order flow dynamics and the elasticity of limit order prices with respect to order flow.  
Perhaps this sensitivity explains why changes in the market for liquidity in a stock are associated 
with volatility in limit order cancellations and submissions. 
More revealing for valuation purposes, however, is a spread in digital calls with an 
infinitesimal spread between the two strike prices.  Since a digital call (put) is equivalent to a 
spread in conventional calls (puts), a spread in digital call (put) options can be replicated by a 
spread in bull (bear) spreads in conventional options or, in more common parlance, by a butterfly   7
spread in three conventional calls (puts).  As shown in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), a 
butterfly spread in conventional options with infinitesimal differences across the three strike 
prices has a payoff proportional to that of a pure Arrow-Debreu claim that pays off only when 
the stock price on expiration equals the intermediate strike price.  Similarly, the payoff of a bull 
spread in digital calls (puts) on order flow pays off only in the intermediate order flow state 
when there is an infinitesimal spread in the order flow states. Hence, the analysis of the 
contingent claims implicit in limit orders yields a new interpretation of the slope of the limit 
order book.   
3.  Limit Order Valuation and Order Flow Bets  
Hence, the contingent claims implicit in limit orders can be viewed as the payoffs on two 
American, deferred premium, one-touch, binary or digital options.  They are American options 
because limit orders are generally good until cancelled and they are one-touch options because 
they pay a fixed quantity of shares or dollars if the market order exceeds the tier of the book on 
which the limit order resides.  They are also very short maturity options since they last, at most, 
one trading day.  We need only value the digital options or digital shares implicit in limit orders 
to provide a contingent claims interpretation of the sources of value in limit order books.   
There are nontrivial challenges associated with exploiting this observation.  The 
“underlying asset” is order flow – a non-price state variable – and there is no observable or risk 
premium for order flow risk.  Moreover, order flow is not an exogenous set of outcomes but 
rather is the endogenous product of the trading decisions of informed and uninformed investors. 
In addition, the application of arbitrage reasoning – the natural starting point for the valuation of 
contingent claims – is hampered by the presence of short sales restrictions and the absence of 
natural hedging instruments.  Finally, any such analysis must account for the American nature of 
these implicit order flow derivatives.   8
There is a simple but useful device for thinking through these issues:  imagining a 
parallel but separate market for wagering on order flow in which participants bet by buying and 
selling order flow contingent claims.  In such a market, claim q pays $1 if the next order is for 
exactly q shares – i.e., when Qt = q – and zero otherwise, making it an Arrow-Debreu claim on 
order flow.  As is readily apparent, the cash flows associated with any trading strategy in the 
actual limit order market can be perfectly replicated in the betting market.  When this fictitious 
betting market is isomorphic to general arbitrage-free financial markets, we can freely import 
analysis from that setting to this one when it is convenient to do so.  Additional insights into the 
contingent claims interpretation can be gleaned by being precise about when the betting market 
produces exactly the same state prices as those implicit in the limit order market. 
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to consider the role of interest rates in the analysis.  
As is commonplace in the analysis of generic derivatives, the time value of money drops out of 
the relevant pricing relations if the numeraire is a savings account that accrues at the relevant 
risk-free interest rate.  There is an even better reason to do so in the present setting:  interest rates 
are a second order consideration over (most) market microstructure time scales and so most 
researchers are content to simply set the riskless rate to zero.  On this hypothesis, state prices are 
also risk neutral probabilities for order flow states. 
One nettlesome problem associated with the betting market analogy concerns the 
endogeneity of order flow.  Since order flow states represent the transactions of market order 
traders, such traders have an incentive to place bets on market orders of given sizes and then to 
submit the corresponding market orders in the limit order market.  Accordingly, there can, in 
general, be no trade in the betting market in equilibrium since trades in the actual limit order 
market can be used to perfectly manipulate the betting market.  The simplest solution is to 
assume that market order traders cannot wager in the betting market prior to the placement of   9
market orders.  That is, the natural solution to the problem of endogeneity of order flow is to 
assume there is no intermarket front-running.2 
The limit order market analogue is Assumption 3 of Glosten (1994), which requires 
traders to use only public information when submitting limit orders. That is, informed and 
uninformed traders interpret the information content of posted limit orders in the same way 
under this assumption.  This circumstance will arise when informed investors cannot use limit 
orders by assumption, which is the usual interpretation of Glosten (1994).  However, this 
assumption will also hold when informed traders have no incentive to post limit orders at prices 
different from those that would be submitted by uninformed traders.  If the supply schedule of 
limit orders that would be submitted by uninformed traders is common knowledge, informed 
traders would have no incentive to post orders off the supply schedule.3  They will have the 
incentive to post orders on the schedule if it lies above their valuations for limit sell orders and 
below their valuations for limit buy orders. 
Accordingly, suppose the set of possible market order sizes is given by  t ⊆   Q  and that 
market participants agree that all order sizes in  t Q  are possible.4  Note that  t Q  is likely to be 
bounded since the market will not provide bets for all order sizes if the adverse selection 
problem is severe enough.  In the absence of frictions in the betting market, the usual arbitrage 
argument insures the existence of a set of (not necessarily unique) strictly positive state prices 
tt {( ) , } ψ ∈Q qq , where 
t tt 1 () E[ 1 | ] ψ ψ = − = Qq q F  with E [ | ] ψ •• denoting the associated risk neutral 
                                                 
2 See the bluffing subsection of Lehmann (2005) for a more detailed analysis.  I don’t mean to 
suggest that this issue is easy to deal with in substance but rather that it is easy to find 
assumptions under which order flow endogeneity is not a problem. 
3 By informed trader, I mean those who actually possess value-relevant private information as 
well as noise traders who think they are informed but who are not.   10
expectation. 
While nothing in what follow depends on it, it is natural to ask whether spanning would 
naturally arise in the betting market.5  That is, would bettors naturally write claims on all of  t Q ?  
The answer to this question is yes because the size of the subsequent market order is observable 
and its endogeneity has been assumed away.  If there were at least two investors with different 
shadow prices for some non-traded claim for q* shares, some investor could earn an arbitrage 
profit by buying a claim that pays $1 when the next market order is for q* shares from the low 
valuation investor and selling it to the high valuation investor.  Such riskless profit opportunities 
will not arise if this betting market is arbitrage-free.  Accordingly, it is natural to assume that 
state prices  tt {( ) , } ψ ∈Q qq  are unique because the menu of claims that will be offered in 
arbitrage-free betting markets spans  t Q .  The analogue in the actual limit order market is that its 
book should have orders posted at all feasible trade sizes, a prediction clearly at variance with 
the evidence from actual limit order markets. 
In any event, the question at hand is whether these state prices can be used to value limit 
orders.  What is missing is Vt(q), the value of the asset if a market order of size q arrives at time 
t.  If Vt(q) is common knowledge among market participants and the state prices in the betting 
and limit order markets are identical, the value of a claim to a share in order flow state q is 
simply ψt(q)Vt(q).  The existence of such values crops up in the analysis of generic financial 
markets in the definition of states of nature: the typical assumption is that there is a deterministic 
mapping between cash flows and asset values on the one hand and their associated states of 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Agreement on the possible is necessary for equilibrium to exist in frictionless markets because 
any market participant who believed a given state is impossible will be happy to sell an infinite 
quantity of bets that pay off in that state. 
5 Spanning isn’t necessary since order flow is a non-price state variable and  t Q  can simply be 
defined to be the set of trade sizes offered, which is trivially spanned by construction.   11
nature on the other.  The problem in the present setting, of course, is that there is no observable 
mapping between the value of the asset being traded and order flow states.  The absence of such 
a mapping motivates Assumption 2 of Glosten (1994):  the existence of a function Vt(q) that is 
both nondecreasing in q and common knowledge among market participants, although I will 
assume it is strictly increasing for simplicity. 
Limit order valuation is straightforward when state prices from the betting market are 
identical to those implicit in the book.  Consider a market buy order since the sell side is 
symmetric.  The digital option implicit in the corresponding limit sell order pays Pt(q) when Qt > 
q.  The implicit digital share value is given by the value of a claim to a share in each order flow 
state integrated over order flow states.  Since the values of the implicit digital option and digital 
share are equal: 
 
tt tt 1 u t t 1 t t t t E[ 1 P () | ] E[ 1 V ( u ) d u | ] P () ( u ) d u ( u ) V ( u ) d u ψψ ψψ
∞∞ ∞
≥− = − =⇒ = ∫∫ ∫ Qq Q qq q qq FF  (1) 




tt tt Q qt 1 uq
tt t t t 1
Qq t 1 t uq
(u)V(u)du E[ V ( ) 1 | ]
P( q) E [V( )| q , ]
















QQ  (2) 
which is the risk neutral analogue of the upper tail expectation formula in Glosten (1994).6   
The only remaining question is whether state prices from the betting market are identical 
                                                 
6 As Glosten emphasizes, the fact that it is an upper tail expectation reflects the discriminatory 
nature of the limit order book.  As (2) clearly shows, this observation is independent of the 
probabilities used in the calculation.  In contrast, the conditional mean 
tt t t t 1 P( )=E [V( )| , ] ψ − = qQ Q q F  is the limit order schedule in a nondiscriminatory book. Most 
limit order markets open with a single price auction in which all market orders are consolidated 
into an aggregate net order and executed against the book at the same price.  As noted above, this 
price can be treated as the “liquidating” asset value embedded in the expectations Vt(q).  Note 
also that these single price auctions are isomorphic to the batch auctions studied by Huberman 
and Stanzl (2004).  It may be possible use their results to place restrictions on the “terminal asset   12
to those implicit in the book.  This brings us to the third basic problem with the betting market 
analogy:  the absence of short sales restrictions.  In a betting market, all gambles are in zero net 
supply and, thus, there are obviously no short sales restrictions.  However, the limit order market 
permits no short selling of limit orders and so the frictionless markets assumption cannot apply.  
Since state prices implicit in the book are given by bull spreads in the relevant  limit orders, this 
absence of short sales in the limit order book would appear to be an insuperable barrier to the 
application of the betting market analogy. 
The way out of this conundrum is to recall that a zero net investment portfolio always has 
two interpretations.  The standard one is as an arbitrage portfolio in which any long positions are 
financed by short positions.  However, a zero net investment portfolio also represents a feasible 
change in an existing portfolio with no short positions in which security purchases are financed 
by security sales.  A feasible change is one in which none of the asset sales is so large as to 
create a short position in any asset and an arbitrage portfolio can always be scaled so that no 
long position is exhausted in the absence of indivisibilities.   
It is this second interpretation that is the right one to apply in this context.  A limit order 
trader can always contemplate a swap of all or part of an existing limit order for another at a 
different price point or, for that matter, for none at all.  If one limit order trader with no private 
information perceives that a limit order is mispriced, all such traders will cancel their orders at 
this price point if it is overpriced and they will submit new orders at this price point if it is 
underpriced.  Limit order substitution by sufficiently many patient or value traders is a perfect 
substitute for explicit arbitrage in these circumstances.7     
                                                                                                                                                             
values” determined in opening call auctions which might, in turn, deliver additional 
intertemporal restrictions on order flow state prices.  See the end of Section 4. 
7 This version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing corresponds to one in which the 
portfolio choice problem of an investor with (possibly state dependent) von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences will not have an interior maximum if arbitrage opportunities are   13
The mathematics of risk neutral upper tail expectations naturally dovetails with the 
observation that bull spreads in limit orders reveal the associated implicit state prices.  The slope 











∞ ′ =− =
∫q
q
qq qqq  (3) 
by Leibniz’s rule where λt(q) is the hazard function familiar from survival analysis. Accordingly, 
the risk neutral probabilities implicit in Pt(q) can be extracted from  t P( ) ′ q  given Vt(q) via the 
recursion:8 
  { } tt t () () e x p ( u ) d u ψ λλ =− ∫
q
0 qq  (4) 
Of course, Vt(q) can be uncovered from  t P( ) ′ q  given λt(q) and, thus, ψt(q) as well. 
There is one state that cannot be valued by limit order substitution alone:  the null “trade” 
Qt = 0 that corresponds to changes in the state of the book that arise when non-trade-related 
information arrives in the market.  Recall that limit orders were predetermined with respect to 
market orders conditional on public information by assumption through the tatônnement-like 
process by which traders could freely cancel and replace their limit orders before the next market 
order arrived.  In this model, limit order traders can revise their limit orders in light of any non-
trade-related information as well before exposing them to a market order when  t 0∈Q .   
                                                                                                                                                             
present.  Alternatively, optimizing behavior on the part of market order traders along the lines of 
Assumption 1 of Glosten (1994) along with uninformed risk neutral limit order traders is 
sufficient as well. 
8 After making the relevant substitutions, the discrete version of this formula: 
 
tj tj tk jk1
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is identical to equation 5 of Banz and Miller (1978) with the option price set to zero, Pt(q) equal 
to the underlying asset price, and Vt(q) equal to the strike price.  The formal similarity ends there   14
The analogue in the betting market is a provision for the cancellation of all existing bets 
when the null “trade” arrives.  The wagers on this revised claim are refunded to all market 
participants and new bets are placed, which results in the discovery of new order flow state 
prices during the tatônnement-like process.  That is, these bets are not pure Arrow-Debreu 
securities because they pay a dollar if state  t ∈ q Q  occurs, zero if a market order for any other 
size Qt ≠ 0 arrives, and  t() ϕ − q  if Qt = 0, where  t 1( ) 0 ϕ >> q  is the initial price paid for this 
claim.9   
It is a straightforward matter to construct pure contingent claims by augmenting the asset 
menu – that is, the set of trade size bets – with one additional claim:  a savings account that pays 
a dollar irrespective of order flow outcomes since the interest rate has been normalized to be 












































 units of the riskless savings 
account pays one dollar in state q ≠ 0 and zero otherwise.10  Similarly, a portfolio that is short 
                                                                                                                                                             
as Banz and Miller are not concerned with bull and bear spreads in digital options as opposed to 
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), who (implicitly) construct state prices from such spreads.   
9 Of course, the bets could have been designed so that there was no need to refund the wager.  
That is, bets that pay  t 1( ) ψ − q  if state  t ∈ q Q  occurs,  t() ψ − q  if a market order for any other size 
Qt ≠ 0 arrives, and nothing if Qt = 0 have no up-front costs and, hence, require no refunds if the 
expected risk neutral payoff is zero as in  tt t t () [ 1 () ] [ 1 () ] [ () ] 0 ψ ψψ ψ − +− − = qq q q .  The 
formulation in the text has the virtue of showing how the valuation of Arrow-Debreu securities 
for all of  t Q  save for 0 – that is,  t\0 ∈ q Q  – is affected by the presence of the null trade. 















units of each bet. Since  t() 1 ϕ < q , one unit of the q


















 units of the riskless savings 
account will yield a dollar when q = 0 and zero otherwise.  Hence, state prices are given by the 
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which sum to one because these are risk neutral probabilities due to the normalization of the 
interest rate to zero.   
  Hence, a betting market coupled with access to riskless savings is isomorphic to the 
actual limit order market and so state prices calculated in one setting can be freely transferred to 
the other.  All that was necessary was care in constructing the claims in the betting market so 
that they possessed the relevant features of the contingent claims implicit in limit orders.  These 
characteristics include arbitrage via limit order substitution, the existence of asset values for each 
order flow state, and enough time for the limit order book to be refreshed – after either a market 
order has executed or the arrival of information via the “null trade” – before the next market 
order arrives so that market order traders cannot “front run” the book.  Informed investors will 
have no incentive to post limit orders off of the supply schedule because the schedule that would 
be posted by uninformed traders is common knowledge in these circumstances. 
4.   Limit Order Book Dynamics 
What happens to state prices if information arrives in the market via a market order at 
time t-1?  The answer lies in the change in the information available in the market between time 
t-1 and time t.  Since the information state of the market was Ft-2 at time t-1 and no non-trade-  16
related information hit the market, the new information state is Ft-1 = {Qt-1, Ft-2}.  As a result, the 
state of the world in which the trades at times t and t-1 are q and Qt-1, respectively, is identical to 
that in which the trade at time t-1 is  t1 t1 − − = Qq + Q  due to the structure of information flows 
when Qt-1 ≠ 0.  Hence, state prices at times t and t-1 must be linked by: 
 
tt t1 t1 tt 1 t 1 t 2 t 2 t 1 t 1 () E[ 1 | ] E[ 1 | ] E[ 1 | ] ( ) ψψ ψ ψ ψ
−− =− =− − − − − = == = = Qq Qq Qq + Q qQ q + Q F, FF (6) 
when information arrives only via market orders.   
This restriction generalizes in an obvious way for longer intervals during which all 
information arrival is trade-related.  If the null trade does not occur between times 1 and T, the 
recursion suggested by (6) reveals: 
 
T T1 T1 T2 T1 T2
T-1
T3 T1 T2 T3 1t t1
TT 1 T 2 T 3
T4 0
T1 T1
1t 1 1 t1
() E[ 1 | ] E[ 1 | ] E[ 1 | ]
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− Q  is cumulative signed volume between times 1 and T-1.  It is as though all bets are 
placed at time zero and the bet on the value of cumulative net order flow given by 
T1
1
− Q  is the 
one that paid off. 
What is the analog of these relations in the actual limit order market?  The answer is 
concealed in the equivalence between trades of q and Qt-1 at times t and t-1, respectively, and one 
of  t1 t1 −− = Qq + Q  at time t-1 when  t1 t1 {, } 0 −− ≠ q,Q Q .  The limit order book is discriminatory and 
so limit order traders place orders as though they might confront a single order of  t1 − Q  at time t-1 
or an order of size Qt-1 at time t-1 and another of size q at time t before limit order traders have a 
chance to cancel and replace their limit orders.  When limit orders do so, they need not fear any 
such order splitting on the demand side.  This is the essence of part ii of Proposition 3 of Glosten   17
(1994).  Continuation of the recursion in (6) yields the required relation 
T1
T1 1 () ( ) ψ ψ
− = qq + Q  
between the time t and time 0 limit order books when all information arrives via trades. 
The discriminatory nature of the book coupled with information arrivals that are entirely 
driven by order flow has a surprising implication for limit order book dynamics:  moving up or 
down the limit order book at a point in time is isomorphic to moving across limit order books 
over time in these circumstances.  It is as though there is a single market of size 
T
1 Q  arrives at 
time one and walks up or down the book to the marginal price 
T
11 P( ) Q .  Put differently, the 
marginal price at time T is path independent and Markovian, depending only on 
T
1 Q  if the “null 
trade” representing value-relevant, non-trade-related information arrives at time T+1 or later. 
Note that I am not assuming that the actual time zero limit order book has orders posted 
at all of the possible values of cumulative signed order flow 
T
1 Q  that can occur given the 
stochastic process generating market order flow.  As noted earlier, we would expect the actual 
book to have finite depth at time zero such that sufficiently large values of 
T
1 Q  are not bid or 
offered.  Put differently, actual markets can force informed market order traders to break up their 
orders over time within the implicit constraints associated with free entry and competition in 
limit order placement. 
However, limit order markets that routinely remain in information epochs – that is, 
periods in which all information arrives via market orders – are more likely to satisfy the 
assumption that limit order traders can freely cancel and replace limit orders before the next 
market order arrives.  Limit order traders will post orders at time t-1 on the price schedule 
T1
11 P( )
− + Qq  if no value-relevant, non-trade-related information arrives between times one and 
t-1.  If a market order arrives at time t, limit order traders will post limit orders on the marginal   18
price schedule 
T
11 P( ) + Qq .  If the null trade arrives at time t, limit order traders can cancel all of 
their orders and repost them when they have assimilated the new information.  In fact, this 
process can be automated if limit order traders know how the set of feasible trades evolve over 
time as well as the hypothetical marginal price at time zero for each feasible future level of 
cumulative net order flow.  It is certainly common for microstructure theorists to assume that 
markets experience long information regimes of this sort. 
Most markets open (sometimes more than once per day) and some markets close with a 
single price auction.  While the marginal price schedule is given by the upper tail expectation 
tt t t t 1 P( q) E [V( )| q , ] ψ − =≥ F QQ  due to the discriminatory nature of the book, the uniform nature 
of single price auctions produces prices that are simple expectations 
AA A
TT T T T 1 P( ) E[ V( ) | ] ψ − = QQ F  where T is the time of the single price auction and A denotes 
auction.  This completes the picture of dynamics in such markets:  the upper tail expectation is 
also given by 
AA
tt T t t 1 P( q) E [P ( )| q , ] ψ − =≥ QQ F  due to the law of iterated expectations and the 
expected midquote of the post-auction limit order book is given by 
AA
TT P( ) Q .  It may prove 
useful to connect this analysis with Huberman and Stanzl’s (2004) study of sequences of batch 
auction markets that are isomorphic to single price auctions.   
5.  Conclusion 
This paper provides a road map for building a contingent claims theory of limit order 
markets.  It is grounded in a simple observation:  limit orders are equivalent to a portfolio of 
cash-or-nothing and asset-or-nothing digital options on order flow.  However, limit orders are 
not conventional derivative securities:  order flow is an endogenous, non-price state variable; the 
underlying asset value is a construct, the value of the security in different order flow states; and 
arbitrage trading or hedging of limit orders is not feasible.  Fortunately, none of these problems   19
is fatal since options on order flow can be conceptualized as bets implicit in limit orders, 
arbitrage trading can be replaced by limit order substitution, and plausible assumptions can be 
made about the endogeneity of order flow states and their associated asset values. 
Perhaps surprisingly, both limit order books and their associated implicit state prices 
have a simple dynamic stochastic structure under plausible conditions.  A special feature of limit 
order books is their discriminatory nature and a market order that walks up or down the book as 
it executes is identical to an order that executes one share at a time over time when the only new 
information is the arrival of yet another market order.  Hence, prices at time t can be read off of 
the time one limit order book if the only source of new information arriving between those two 
times is trade-related.   
While I have said nothing about it in this paper, the most interesting aspect of this 
analysis is its implications for the empirical analysis of limit order markets.  Implicit state prices 
can shed light on basic microstructure questions such as the role of risk aversion, if any, in the 
provision of immediacy in limit order markets.  The successful identification of episodes in 
which information arrives only via trade can serve to better measure information flows and to 
provide new insight into the process of price formation.  The expectational linkages between 
periodic single price auctions and continuous trading in limit order markets and even between 
these markets and options markets should shed considerable light on the economics of the 
associated intertemporal and cross-market comparisons.   
I have called the paper “Notes…” because the theory is as yet incomplete.  It seems to me 
to be worthwhile to present it in this somewhat embryonic state since both the broad outline of 
the theory and the work needed to complete it seem reasonably clear.  And I thought that its link 
to my glimpse of David Whitcomb’s limit order trading system, the progenitor of his extremely 
successful company Automated Trading Desk, made it fitting as well.    20  21
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